By Dr Wendy C. Grenade
The heads of government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) met in Guyana 4-6 July 2016 for their 37th regular conference. This meeting was held in the wake of growing uncertainty given the implications of the 23 June ‘Brexit’ vote, as well as the threat of de-risking posed by international banks limiting or terminating their relationships with regional financial institutions. In fact, both issues were high on CARICOM’s agenda.
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| Dr Wendy C. Grenade is a lecturer in political science and coordinator of the MSc Integration Studies Programme, Department of Government, Sociology and Social Work, Faculty of Social Sciences, The University of The West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, Barbados: Email |
The record shows that given a confluence of external and internal forces, CARICOM countries have made and continue to make staggered steps to achieve development through regionalism.
CARICOM was established in 1973. Therefore, the recent 37th regular meeting of the conference of heads should have been the 43rd regular meeting. However, CARICOM heads of government did not meet for six years (1976-81) given a political divide among heads (termed ideological pluralism) and the negative impact of external economic shocks and ensuing structural adjustment programmes, which forced countries to look inward.
CARICOM could have died in its infancy subsequent to political and economic tsunamis of the 1970s and 80s. Yet despite many set-backs, broken promises and a chronic implementation paralysis, CARICOM continues to plod along. Nonetheless, inertia within the community of Caribbean states has given rise to growing discontent within the community of Caribbean peoples. Many Caribbean citizens feel alienated from a regionalist project that seems distant from their everyday lives.
However, a fair and balanced assessment of CARICOM reveals a mixed score card.
Functional cooperation is one of the relatively successful pillars of CARICOM. What has emerged in the Caribbean is a network of over 30 institutions and associate institutions that work in collaboration with international development agencies to promote co-operation in several critical areas that in turn benefit Caribbean people.
For example, in direct and indirect ways Caribbean people benefit from functional cooperation in the areas of health (e.g. surveillance and management of chikungunya and zika viruses and control of the HIV/AIDS pandemic); disaster management, climate change research and education (CXC and the UWI).
In the area of foreign policy coordination CARICOM has had mixed outcomes through time. In instances when Caribbean countries leverage their 14 votes, they are able to amass collective gains. Sir Shridath Ramphal often reminds us that, as newly independent states, CARICOM countries demonstrated great resolve, playing leading roles in:
• The fight against apartheid in South Africa
• Negotiating the Lomé Conventions (1975-2000) between the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States and the European Community
• UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
• UN Conference on the Law of the Sea
• Negotiating joint councils with Canada, Cuba, Japan, Mexico, the USA and the G3 (Columbia, Venezuela and Mexico)
• Having Caribbean nationals appointed to head leading organisations such as the Commonwealth and the ACP
• Assisting with Guyana-Venezuela and Belize-Guatemala territorial disputes
In the contemporary era, while CARICOM countries have consistently demonstrated solidarity with Cuba and are mounting collective resistance to promote climate mitigation and adaptation, they did not have a common position in the recent race for the Commonwealth secretary-general. That was a display of immaturity and a sign of reversal.
Additionally, some CARICOM countries have diplomatic relations with China while others recognise Taiwan. In my view the China/Taiwan issue does not fundamentally threaten CARICOM. The challenge is for small developing states to strategically balance foreign policy coordination in the context of regionalism while maximizing the advantages of a multi-polar world.
In 2010, CARICOM included security cooperation as the Community’s fourth pillar. This initiative was one of the major contributions to CARICOM by the late Patrick Manning, former prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago. Given the multiple, cross-cutting security threats that bedevil Caribbean people in their daily lives, security cooperation is an imperative for Caribbean development. CARICOM’s security architecture includes intelligence sharing and collaboration among law enforcement officials.
The work of the CARICOM Implementing Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) and the Regional Security System (between the OECS countries and Barbados) must be applauded. During the recent CARICOM heads meeting in Guyana, prime minister of Dominica and chairman of the 37th heads of government conference, the Honourable Roosevelt Skerrit, announced that before year end an arrest warrant treaty will take effect as part of a wider mission to improve cooperation among law enforcement authorities and to boost security in the region. This is a step in the right direction.
It is much too early to assess the relative success of security regionalism in the Caribbean. However, as insecurities intensify, Caribbean countries are becoming part of a regional security complex where their security concerns must by necessity be resolved through collective action.
Economic integration is generally problematic for every regional scheme. It requires sacrifice, since costs are incurred in the short term while expected benefits are accrued over a longer period. It also simultaneously generates poles of growth and poles of stagnation creating ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.
To support economic integration, the CARICOM leadership signed and ratified the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. This allows for the movement of goods, capital, services and labour (though the latter is limited). Governments have put the framework in place, it is now up to Caribbean firms and Caribbean people to utilise the treaty to their benefit.
Importantly, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) provides the legal framework to make economic integration a reality. The Shanique Myrie case is a glaring example of how CARICOM nationals can utilise the original jurisdiction of the CCJ to benefit from regionalism.
That being said, the reality is, the factors that provide an incentive for economic integration in the Caribbean are the very conditions that threaten its viability. These include, inter alia: an unfavourable global environment; small size and diseconomies of scale; undiversified economies; uneven development and limited resources.
The problem is exacerbated by other factors, such as concerns with sovereignty, autonomy and territoriality; nationalism; administrative and bureaucratic obstructions; xenophobia, other racial, class and gender disparities; and the MDC/LDC divide. Nonetheless, there should be no retreat from economic integration.
Finally, in 2023, CARICOM will celebrate 50 years as an integration movement. The next seven years should be characterised by bold visionary leadership; consolidation of gains; democratisation of regionalism; and ACTION.
I propose the following:
CARICOM requires visionary leadership for its continued survival. I call for strategic agenda-setting to give greater meaning to the rotating chairmanship of CARICOM. The incoming chair should champion one or two critical issues that are meaningful to Caribbean people. Prior to assuming the chairmanship, a strategic advisory committee (including experts on regionalism) should be established to devise a roadmap for the chairmanship. Rotating chairmanships must be meaningful and defining. Perhaps CARICOM heads may wish to consider one year instead of a six-month chairmanship.
Additionally, one of the main shortcomings of CARICOM is its democratic deficiencies and its inability to convince Caribbean people of its relevance. Regionalism must be meaningful to the people it is intended to serve. Participatory regionalism will enlarge democratic spaces in the Caribbean. I endorse the proposal by CARICOM heads for a Caribbean-wide public education campaign on the benefits and limitations of CARICOM. I call for these Citizen-CARICOM dialogues to be inserted as an institutionalised pillar of CARICOM. I also propose that the next CARIFESTA should intentionally seek to showcase the successes of CARICOM. Gains must be celebrated and consolidated.
There are lessons CARICOM can glean from the sub-regional grouping of the OECS, which has one of the deepest forms of economic and monetary unions outside of the EU. With a common currency among seven of the 15 CARICOM countries, the glass is almost half full. The OECS model can be a stepping stone to deeper and wider Caribbean regionalism to include Cuba and other sister states in the Circum-Caribbean.
The 1992 Report of the West Indian Commission threw out a clarion call: Time for Action! Twenty-four years later, there should be no retreat from that call.
